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REGULATING THE PRIVATIZED SECURITY INDUSTRY: 
THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
Laura A. Dickinson* 
As governments around the world increasingly turn to contractors to 
provide government services in the sphere of military and foreign affairs, 
significant problems of accountability arise. Traditional public governmental 
mechanisms of regulation and accountability, as well as accountability through 
litigation, are often inadequate or unavailable. International legal instruments 
similarly offer only minimal enforcement of human rights or other public-
regarding norms, and in any event they may not always apply to nonstate 
actors. As a result, we must find new forms of public/private governance and 
oversight in this rapidly expanding area of military and quasi-military 
operations. 
The widespread role of contractors in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
highlights these challenges.1 At many times during these conflicts, the ratio of 
contractors to troops hovered around one to one, reflecting a huge shift in the 
way the U.S. government projects its power overseas.2 As the Commission for 
Wartime Contracting has documented, the U.S. government increased the use 
of contractors at the same time that it radically reduced the number of 
contracting oversight personnel, weakening the kind of managerial oversight 
that can help prevent abuses.3 Although many contractors performed their jobs 
admirably—and indeed many gave their lives in what is a generally untold 
story of sacrifice during these wars—when some did commit abuses there were 
very few workable accountability mechanisms on the back end.4 The 
 
 * Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University School of 
Law. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium at Emory Law 
School, February 2013, and at workshops held at Cornell Law School and at American University Washington 
College of Law. My thanks to participants at all three events for helpful comments and suggestions.  
 1 LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF 
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1–22 (2011). 
 2 See id. at 1–40.  
 3 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., DEFENSE AGENCIES MUST IMPROVE THEIR 
OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEMS TO REDUCE WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 7 (2009), available 
at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929221533/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC 
_SR1_business-systems_2009-09-21.pdf.  
 4 See Daphne Eviatar, 3 Years After Blackwater Massacre in Iraq, Contractors Still Lack Accountability 
and Oversight, DAILY KOS (Sept. 16, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/09/16/902433/-3-
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debarment system5 is notoriously ineffectual,6 and criminal cases have often 
stalled due to botched evidence-gathering, jurisdictional gaps, and other 
problems.7 
In my own work, I have long argued that, to the extent that we care about 
ensuring that contractors respect core public values such as human rights, we 
should look toward new modes of accountability and constraint to protect those 
values.8 In particular, the human rights community has sometimes tended to 
focus on the creation of new treaties to address nongovernmental actors, or 
they have limited their vision to tackling governmental misconduct rather than 
misconduct by private contractors. While such efforts are tremendously 
important, I have suggested that there are other innovative accountability 
mechanisms that are equally (if not more) important, such as reforming the 
 
Years-After-Blackwater-Massacre-in-Iraq-Contractors-Still-Lack-Accountability-and-Oversight; see also 
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & NINA M. SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 23 (2007), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470189. 
 5 The U.S. government uses the suspension and debarment system to protect its interests from bad actors 
performing U.S. government contracts. FAR 9.402(b) (2012). Except in compelling circumstances, see id. 
9.405(a), 9.405-1(a), a contractor who is suspended or debarred is prohibited from obtaining future federal 
government contracts. Id. 9.405(a). Suspensions and debarments in the United States arise from either an 
agency’s discretionary decision, id. 9.406-2, a statutory mandate, or, in some instances, an agency’s de facto 
action. Agency officials may impose discretionary suspensions and debarments after a finding of wrongdoing 
such as fraud, bribery, making false statements, or repeated performance failures. See, e.g., id. 9.406-2(a)(3) 
(providing for debarment for making false statements); id. 9.406-2(b)(1)(i)(B) (providing for debarment for 
repeated performance failures); see also id. 9.406-2(b)(1) (referring to Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 102 Stat. 4181 
(1988) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 701–707 (2006))) (providing for discretionary debarment for 
drug use). Statutory suspension and debarments are automatic sanctions arising from violations of certain laws, 
sometimes resulting in an indictment or conviction. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2408(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting any 
individual convicted of fraud or felonies arising out of a contract with the Department of Defense from 
involvement with future defense contracts); 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012) (prohibiting, with limited exception, drug 
trafficking convicts from receiving federal benefits, including federal contracts); 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006) 
(setting forth environmental water standards); 2 C.F.R. § 1532.1100 (2013) (laying out the agency’s 
accompanying suspension and debarment regulatory administration). De facto debarments arise when an 
agency blacklists a contractor, either pursuant to a particular law, see, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 841(a)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 1298, 1510 (2011) (“Prohibition on 
Contracting with the Enemy in the United States Central Command Theater of Operations”), or through a 
permanent finding that a contractor is nonresponsible, see, e.g., MG Altus Apache Co. v. United States, 111 
Fed. Cl. 425, 451 (2013) (finding that the agency’s permanent finding that a contractor was nonresponsible, 
resulting in blacklisting of the contractor, was reasonable). 
 6 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., supra note 3. 
 7 See DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 43.  
 8 See, e.g., id., at 39. 
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terms of the contracts themselves, developing codes of conduct, and building a 
variety of governmental and nongovernmental accreditation regimes.9 
Now, we have a promising example pushing in some of these new 
directions. The human rights community, partnering with industry and 
government, has produced a voluntary International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers (hereinafter “ICoC” or “the Code”),10 along 
with a proposed governance and oversight mechanism in order to enforce the 
Code.11 Both the Code and oversight mechanism are the product of many years 
of dedicated work by what may seem to be an unlikely partnership of actors in 
a strikingly open and transparent process.12 The resulting mechanism has yet to 
take effect, but its parameters are sufficiently established that a preliminary 
evaluation is appropriate.13 
In this Article, I first describe the development of both the Code and its 
accompanying oversight mechanism as well as some of the key features of this 
regime. Then, I evaluate the emerging regime and its potential to reflect and 
promote core public values. Such values include, substantively, the values of 
human dignity embedded in human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the 
procedural values of global administrative law: public participation, 
transparency, and accountability. And I will examine both the process by 
which this regime was created and the substantive terms and enforcement 
mechanism of the regime itself. In the end, although we will need to wait to see 
how this Code is ultimately implemented and enforced, I conclude that it holds 
a great deal of promise both as an accountability mechanism for private 
military contractors and as a model for future public/private accountability 
regimes. Significantly, as compared to other voluntary industry codes of 
 
 9 Id. at 40–68; see also Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liberty: Use of the 
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. 
& C.L. 365, 375–77 (2006). 
 10 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2010), 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_ 
Names.pdf [hereinafter ICOC].  
 11 INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS’ ASS’N, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
(2013), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf [hereinafter ARTICLES OF 
ASSOCIATION]. 
 12 See SWITZ. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 2 (2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Fact_Sheet_ICoC_ 
November_2011.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting that the ICoC process involved private security 
companies, industry associations, governmental representatives, and various humanitarian and 
nongovernmental organizations).  
 13 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11. 
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conduct, this regime creates the possibility for greater oversight, 
accountability, and independent monitoring. Although it is too soon to tell 
whether the ICoC framework will be effective in practice, it may, in time, offer 
a useful roadmap for other industries where formal legal mechanisms are 
insufficient. 
I. THE ICOC REGIME 
The ICoC regime began as an initiative of the Swiss government, in 
partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to 
respond to ambiguities regarding the applicability of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) to contractors.14 The Swiss, who have a unique history 
with the ICRC and feel a special obligation to promote and protect IHL, 
convened a group of experts, government representatives, civil society groups, 
and industry actors to consider the issues.15 A series of meetings and 
conversations resulted in the Montreux Document, a statement of principles 
that did not purport to be a new treaty, but rather derived principles from 
existing treaties and applied them specifically to contractors.16 
It became clear that more was needed, however, to provide guidance and 
oversight to private security contractors, and so a further initiative to establish 
an international code of conduct for the industry was launched. The Swiss 
convinced the United States and the United Kingdom to work with leaders of 
the private security industry and various human rights groups over a period of 
several years to develop both a substantive code of conduct and a governance 
mechanism to implement the code. The resulting drafting group, called the 
“Association” for purposes of the ultimate Code, maintains ultimate authority 
to implement the Code’s provisions.17 
A. The ICoC’s Substantive Provisions 
The Code itself is a strikingly detailed and comprehensive document that 
explicitly applies key principles of human rights and humanitarian law to 
 
 14 See ICoC Timeline, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-
psp.org/ICoC_Timeline.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 15 See The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T 
FOREIGN AFF., http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html (last visited Dec. 
13, 2013). 
 16 See id. 
 17 See About the ICoC Association, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Association.html (last visited Dec 13, 2013).  
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private security contractors. This is significant because the treaties from which 
these principles are derived are often ambiguous about their applicability to 
nongovernmental actors. As such, the ICoC fills important gaps in 
international law without the need for a long and laborious treaty-revision 
process. Instead, companies that sign on to the Code agree to respect these core 
principles.18 Moreover, the Code spells out the companies’ obligations in 
detail.19 And, beyond requiring companies simply to make normative 
commitments, the Code goes further and obligates signatories to reform 
particular organizational and procedural practices to implement the Code.20 
An in-depth description of a few of these normative commitments gives a 
flavor of the specificity and detail of the document. For example, the Code 
clearly prohibits companies from engaging in excessive force, explicitly stating 
that company personnel shall not “exceed what is strictly necessary, and 
should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation.”21 
Similarly, companies undertake to ensure that their personnel do “not use 
firearms against persons except in self-defence or [in] defence of others against 
the imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of 
a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”22 To the extent that 
company personnel assist a government’s law-enforcement authority, signatory 
companies agree to require personnel to comply with all applicable 
international and domestic law and, at “a minimum, with the standards 
expressed in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).”23 As with other sections of 
the Code, the use-of-force provisions cover situations involving armed conflict, 
when international humanitarian law would ordinarily govern, as well as 
during peacetime, when international human rights law would dominate.24 
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is 
similarly precise. The Code does not speak to these terms directly, instead 
 
 18 ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 16 (“Signatory Companies agree to operate in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Code.”).  
 19 See id. ¶¶ 28–43 (establishing general commitments of signatories to the Code and enumerating 
specific principles regarding the conduct of personnel, including the use of force, detention, apprehension, and 
sexual exploitation).  
 20 See id. ¶¶ 16–27. 
 21 Id. ¶ 30. 
 22 Id. ¶ 31. 
 23 Id. ¶ 32.  
 24 See id. ¶¶ 30–32. 
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referencing current international law.25 However, the Code makes clear that, 
“[f]or the avoidance of doubt, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, as referred to here, includes conduct by a private 
entity which would constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment if committed by a public official.”26 The Code further 
elaborates that this obligation is non-derogable, emphasizing that 
“[c]ontractual obligations, superior orders” or other “exceptional 
circumstances,” such as armed conflict or other public emergencies, “can never 
be a justification for engaging in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”27 
In addition, the Code devotes considerable attention to other violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law. For example, companies agree to prohibit 
their personnel from engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse, gender-based 
violence, human trafficking, slavery, forced labor, child labor, and 
discrimination.28 The Code also prohibits company personnel from engaging in 
detention unless a government contract specifically allows it, and in any event 
makes clear that all detainees must be treated humanely and in accord with the 
international law applicable to their status.29 Finally, the Code makes clear that 
company personnel may not “take or hold any persons except when 
apprehending persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent 
threat of violence, or following an attack or crime” against the company or 
clients.30 
Of course, as the history of bills of rights demonstrates, it is sometimes 
easier to sign sweeping statements of principle than it is to build mechanisms 
that will create actual enforcement on the ground. To that end, the ICoC goes 
further, requiring companies not only to state their adherence to these 
humanitarian and human rights norms, but also to make commitments 
regarding internal management and governance to ensure implementation of 
the Code. First, signatory companies undertake to incorporate the Code “into 
Company policies and internal control and compliance systems and integrate it 
into all relevant elements of their operations.”31 In addition, they make quite 
 
 25 Id. ¶ 21. 
 26 Id. ¶ 35. 
 27 Id. ¶ 36. In this regard, the Code goes further than some articulations of international law, which imply 
that torture is non-derogable but that cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment may not be. 
 28 Id. ¶ 22. 
 29 Id. ¶ 33. 
 30 Id. ¶ 34.  
 31 Id. ¶ 44.  
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specific commitments to engage in critical organizational practices and 
procedures. For example, they commit to vet and train employees 
extensively.32 As to vetting, notably, companies agree to “establish and 
maintain internal policies and procedures to determine the suitability of 
applicants, or Personnel, to carry weapons as part of their duties.”33 These 
procedures include checks to ensure personnel have not been convicted of a 
crime “that would indicate that the individual lacks the character and fitness to 
perform security services” pursuant to the Code.34 The checks must also 
establish that personnel or prospective personnel have not been dishonorably 
discharged, had employment terminated for violations of one of the principles 
contained in the Code, or had a history of other conduct that “brings into 
question their fitness to carry a weapon.”35 
As to training, companies agree to ensure that all personnel performing 
security services are aware of the Code and relevant international and national 
law.36 With respect to weapons training in particular, the Code provides that 
companies must ensure that personnel carrying weapons have received 
appropriate training for the specific weapon in question, that personnel receive 
regular and recurrent training, and that the training includes specific instruction 
on the rules regarding the use of force.37 The Code further extends these 
requirements to subcontractors.38 Thus, companies that sign the Code agree 
that if the subcontractor cannot fulfill the vetting and training requirements in 
the Code, the primary contracting company “will take reasonable and 
appropriate steps to ensure that all selection, vetting and training of 
subcontractor’s Personnel is conducted in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Code.”39 Relatedly, firms agree that the explicit terms of 
contracts with individual employees contain key principles laid out in the 
Code.40 
 
 32 Id. ¶¶ 45–49. 
 33 Id. ¶ 48. 
 34 Id. ¶ 48(a). The Code further lists specific disqualifying crimes: “battery, murder, arson, fraud, rape, 
sexual abuse, organized crime, bribery, corruption, perjury, torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking or trafficking 
in persons.” Id. ¶ 48.  
 35 Id. ¶ 48(d). In addition, companies agree to exercise general due diligence in employee selection, 
id. ¶ 45; to refrain from hiring individuals under the age of eighteen to perform security functions, id. ¶ 46; and 
to require applicants to authorize access to prior employment records. Id. ¶ 49.  
 36 Id. ¶ 55. 
 37 Id. ¶ 59.  
 38 Id. ¶ 51. The Code’s definition section includes subcontractors within the scope of “implementation.” 
Id. § B. 
 39 Id. ¶ 51. 
 40 Id. ¶ 52. 
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Other important provisions concern obligations to manage weapons41 and 
the materiel of war42 responsibly, and to report certain Code violations.43 The 
Code is particularly stringent in requiring signatory companies to prepare an 
incident report “documenting any incident involving its Personnel that involves 
the use of any weapon.”44 The report must include the time and location of the 
incident, the identity and nationality of any persons involved, any injuries or 
damage sustained, an account of the circumstances, and a description of 
measures the company has taken in response.45 The report must be submitted 
to the client and, where warranted, other competent authorities.46 Similarly, the 
Code details reporting obligations in the case of torture or cruel treatment.47 
Companies must require personnel to report any known or suspected “acts of 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” to the 
client and competent authorities in either the host country or the country of 
nationality of the victim or perpetrator.48 
Finally, the Code obligates each signatory to establish internal grievance 
procedures for both its own employees and third parties to invoke in cases of 
alleged Code violations.49 This provision is somewhat vague as to precisely 
what those procedures must be, but it does specify that “[p]rocedures must be 
fair, accessible and offer effective remedies, including recommendations for 
the prevention of recurrence.”50 The companies must post details on their 
websites regarding how third parties can invoke the procedures, and they must 
investigate allegations promptly, keep records of proceedings (which must be 
turned over to competent authorities when appropriate), cooperate with official 
investigations, and provide whistleblower protections for employees who 
report in good faith.51 As with the prohibition against torture, these provisions 
fill gaps in domestic U.S. law (and possibly the laws of other countries), which 
tends not to protect whistleblowers from the private sector as vigorously as 
governmental employees. 
 
 41 Id. ¶¶ 56–58. 
 42 Id. ¶¶ 60–62. 
 43 Id. ¶ 63. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. ¶ 37. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. ¶ 66.  
 50 Id. ¶ 67(a). 
 51 Id. ¶ 67(b)–(g). 
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B. Enforcement of the ICoC 
Although, as summarized above, the ICoC is normatively quite robust, it 
does not contain a formal enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless, by signing 
the Code, companies do affirm that they “have sufficient financial capacity in 
place” to cover any liabilities for damages.52 And, significantly, they 
acknowledge that the ICoC is merely the first step in the establishment of a 
true oversight and governance regime. Indeed, by signing the Code, companies 
agree that within eighteen months, the overall association of governmental and 
nongovernmental stakeholders will “[e]stablish objective and measurable 
standards for providing Security Services based upon this Code,” as well as 
“[e]stablish external independent mechanisms for effective governance and 
oversight.”53 Specifically, the companies commit to support the process for 
creating a true oversight mechanism, and, once it is established, they agree to 
“become certified by and submit to ongoing independent Auditing and 
verification by that mechanism.”54 
Obviously, the robustness of this oversight mechanism will be crucial to 
the overall effectiveness of the Code as a whole. Therefore, it is worth taking 
some time to consider how this mechanism will be created. The relevant 
document that lays out the features of the governance and oversight 
mechanism is the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and it is now in its 
finalized form.55 The Charter lays out four primary functions: (1) governance 
of the mechanism itself; (2) certification of member companies; (3) 
performance assessment of member companies through a combination of self-
reporting, information from public and other available sources, and 
independent monitoring; and (4) grievance processes.56 The final draft pulls 
back from more robust language, contained in earlier drafts, specifying 
independent performance assessment of companies in the field.57 But the 
overall framework still allows for at least some independent monitoring of 
companies on the ground and holds promise as a meaningful regime of 
oversight and accountability. 
 
 52 Id. ¶ 69. 
 53 Id. ¶ 7. 
 54 Id. ¶ 8. 
 55 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Compare id. art. 11, with Second Draft of the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, art. 11 (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Draft_Articles_of_Association_January_30_-_final.pdf [hereinafter Second Draft]. 
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As to the first function, overarching governance authority rests not in the 
overall Association, but in a twelve-member Board of Directors, with four 
directors drawn from each constituency group: industry, government, and civil 
society.58 The Charter lays out criteria and processes for entities from within 
each constituency group to become members of the regime (although some of 
these criteria and processes remain within the Board’s discretion to develop 
after the regime is established).59 Entities from within each group then select 
the Board members from that group.60 All members may participate in a 
general meeting,61 but it is the Board of Directors that is the primary decision-
maker for the governance mechanism.62 The Board, which generally is to make 
decisions by a majority of eight (including a minimum of two votes from each 
stakeholder group), controls the budget, lays out procedures, and appoints an 
Executive Director and Secretariat, who in turn oversee the day-to-day 
operations of the governance regime.63 
Second, the oversight mechanism is meant to govern the certification of 
companies who have signed the Code. The Charter provides that independent 
monitors, accredited by the Board, are to conduct a review to examine each 
company’s systems and processes to make sure it is doing everything it said it 
would do when it signed the Code.64 The precise certification requirements and 
processes remain to be worked out by the Board.65 The Charter permits the 
Board to rely on independent international standards if the Board recognizes 
that the standards are consistent with the Code, and, at the same time, allows 
the Board to specify “any additional information relevant to the human rights 
and humanitarian impact of operations it deems necessary for assessing 
whether a company’s systems and policies meet the requirements of the Code 
and its readiness to participate in the Association.”66 
This reference to outside standards is significant in part because of a 
parallel effort, independent of the ICoC, to set standards for the industry 
through the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 
 
 58 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, arts. 3.1, 7.2.  
 59 Id. art. 3. 
 60 Id. art. 7.2. 
 61 Id. art. 6. 
 62 Id. arts. 7.1, 8. 
 63 Id. arts. 7, 9.  
 64 See id. art. 12.  
 65 See id. art. 11.  
 66 Id. art. 11.2.1. 
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International Standards Organization (ISO).67 One of the questions during the 
development of the Charter has been to what extent these other certifications 
would be sufficient to qualify a private security firm for certification under the 
ICoC regime. Certainly, requiring companies to satisfy multiple certification 
processes could be costly. However, if these other processes can simply 
substitute for independent certification under the ICoC, it is unclear what bite 
the ICoC will have, particularly if the substantive certification criteria of the 
ICoC are in any respect more stringent than the alternatives. The Charter, in its 
most recent draft, essentially punts on this question by leaving it up to the 
Board to resolve.68 However, by suggesting that certification by another 
standards organization could get a firm partway to ICoC certification,69 the 
drafters of the Charter seem to be seeking to strike a compromise by 
harnessing the efficiencies of certification through other organizations, while 
allowing for additional requirements distinct to the ICoC certification regime. 
Third, it is clear from the Charter that the Code is not simply a voluntary 
self-regulatory system. Instead, the Charter envisions some degree of ongoing 
independent evaluation of companies’ performance,70 although that function is 
a bit less well-defined than it was in previous drafts.71 As in the case of 
certification, the Charter charges the Board with developing additional 
procedures.72 But the Charter itself lays out in broad strokes what process is 
envisioned. The overall association of stakeholders is “responsible for 
exercising oversight of Member companies’ performance under the Code, 
including through external monitoring, reporting and a process to address 
alleged violations of the code.”73 Member companies must provide the 
Association with “a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a 
transparent set of criteria covered by necessary confidentiality and 
nondisclosure arrangements.”74 In addition to these self-assessments, “field 
based review” may be authorized on the basis of “a human rights risk 
assessment” in order to “assess the human rights impacts of company 
 
 67 See ASIS INT’L, ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012, MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR QUALITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY 
COMPANY OPERATIONS—REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE, (2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/ 
Item_1997-PSC_1_STD.PDF. 
 68 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 11.  
 69 Id. art. 11.2.1. 
 70 See id. art. 12 (enumerating various oversight procedures and providing that a method to address 
violations of the Code shall be established). 
 71 See Second Draft, supra note 57, arts. 11, 12. 
 72 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 12.2. 
 73 Id. art. 12.1.  
 74 Id. art. 12.2.2. 
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operations.”75 These assessments are to be conducted by gathering information 
from public sources such as clients, local authorities, affected communities, 
and other relevant groups and individuals, using established human rights 
methodologies.76 It remains unclear precisely who will conduct the “field-
based review,” and much will depend on the efficacy of these types of on-the-
ground assessments. 
In response to the information gathered through these various means, the 
Charter requires the Secretariat of the Association to engage in dialogue with 
member companies to help improve performance of ICoC obligations both in 
general and with respect to specific concerns.77 The Board is also charged with 
reviewing performance and compliance issues, and may do so either at the 
referral of the Executive Director or on its own initiative.78 In cases of 
noncompliance with the ICoC, the Board may request a specific company to 
take corrective action.79 If the company does not do so, the Board may impose 
sanctions, which can include suspension or termination of membership.80 The 
Charter requires the Association to publicly report, at least annually, on its 
monitoring activities and, in general, to promote the objectives of Code 
compliance.81 
Finally, the Association is charged with facilitating the resolution of 
grievances brought by company personnel or third parties.82 The Charter 
provides that aggrieved individuals may submit claims to the Secretariat, and 
the claims must contain specific allegations of conduct that would violate the 
Code and allege harm to one or more claimants.83 The Charter requires the 
Secretariat to inform the claimant of available fair and effective grievance 
procedures, including those within the company in question.84 If the claimant 
alleges that the company’s grievance mechanism is “not fair, not accessible, 
[or] does not or cannot offer an effective remedy,” then the Secretariat itself 
may review that allegation.85 If the Secretariat determines that the company’s 
 
 75 Id. art. 12.2.3–.4. 
 76 See id. art. 12.2.1–.4. 
 77 Id. art. 12.2.5. 
 78 Id. art. 12.2.6. 
 79 Id. art. 12.2.7.  
 80 Id. arts. 12.2.7, 13.2.7. 
 81 Id. art. 12.3. 
 82 Id. art. 13.1. 
 83 Id. art. 13.2.1. 
 84 Id. art. 13.2.2.  
 85 Id. art. 13.2.3. 
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grievance mechanism does not comply with the Code, the Secretariat may 
recommend corrective action to the company and may refer the claim “to 
another[] identified fair and accessible grievance procedure that may offer an 
effective remedy.”86 The Board may also make such a recommendation, which 
may include, specifically, “cooperation with the Association’s good offices, 
the provision of a neutral and confidential mediation process, or other 
arrangements that may assist the Member company to offer an effective 
remedy as required by paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Code.”87 The Association 
may not, however, impose specific awards.88 The Charter further requires that, 
throughout the process, companies are “expected to cooperate in good faith, 
consistent with applicable law and contractual requirements.”89 If the Board 
determines that the company is not doing so, it may impose sanctions on the 
firm, including suspension or expulsion from the Association.90 
The Association’s role in facilitating grievances is perhaps the least well-
developed aspect of the governance regime. For example, it is unclear 
precisely what criteria the Board or Secretariat will use to determine whether a 
company’s internal grievance process is adequate. As noted above, a claimant 
may allege that a company’s grievance procedure is “not fair, not accessible, 
[or] does not or cannot offer an effective remedy,” but this language is vague.91 
The Code also states that the internal grievance process must include 
“recommendations for the prevention of recurrence,” must “facilitate 
reporting,” must “publish details” of the grievance process on a website, and 
must “investigate allegations promptly, impartially and with due consideration 
to confidentiality.”92 The Board will thus have a good deal of discretion in 
determining precisely how the review of internal grievance mechanisms will 
work and how stringent the application of these criteria will ultimately be. 
Likewise, it is still unclear what kind of alternative grievance mechanism 
the Board will recommend if it determines that a company lacks an effective 
internal company process. Apart from general language that “[t]his may 
include cooperation with the Association’s good offices, the provision of a 
neutral and confidential mediation process, or other arrangements that may 
 
 86 Id. art. 13.2.4. 
 87 Id. art. 13.2.5.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. art. 13.2.7. 
 90 Id. arts. 12.2.7, 13.2.7. 
 91 Id. art. 13.2.3. 
 92 ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 67. 
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assist the Member company to offer an effective remedy,” there is little 
guidance for the Board.93 Mediation must be “neutral and confidential,” but 
multiple types of mediation could be used, and it is also unclear who the 
mediators will be or how they will be chosen.94 The language suggesting 
“cooperation with the Association’s good offices” and “other arrangements” is 
even less clear.95 
A final lingering, open question is the relationship between any grievance 
process and the official civil or criminal proceedings that may be available in 
the host country, the client state, or the country of nationality of the victim or 
alleged perpetrator. The Charter provides that the mere existence of parallel 
proceedings does not necessarily suspend the ICoC’s grievance process, but 
the Board is to consider such proceedings and retains the discretion to 
“suspend or otherwise limit the complaints process as necessary and 
appropriate in order to avoid serious prejudice to any such investigations or 
proceedings or party thereto.”96 
Certainly deference to parallel proceedings may sometimes be appropriate. 
For example, in the case of the Baghdad Nisour Square shooting by 
Blackwater guards working for the U.S. State Department, multiple 
investigations by multiple governments and government agencies complicated 
prosecutorial efforts by tainting evidence.97 Moreover, informal settlements 
and mediation awards might interfere with civil litigation. In some U.S. tort 
cases against contractors, for example, courts have suggested that remedies 
outside the tort system, such as military compensation payments to victims 
under the Foreign Claims Act, might strengthen the arguments for a broad 
interpretation of contractor immunity and preemption doctrines.98 
The ICoC and the Charter acknowledge these issues, signaling that the 
Board and Association should be mindful of potential problems.99 And, of 
course, it would be cause for concern if settlements through the ICoC process 
were used to relieve a party of tort liability later. On the other hand, tort 
 
 93 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 13.2.5.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. art. 13.2.10. 
 97 DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 55. 
 98 See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (identifying availability of alternative 
compensation for victims under Foreign Claims Act as one rationale for broad approach to contractor 
immunity and preemption doctrines that would preclude tort litigation). 
 99 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 13.2.10. 
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litigation has not so far been a particularly fruitful avenue of redress for 
victims of contractor abuse overseas,100 and the ICoC grievance mechanisms 
may prove to be a more effective remedy over time. But as with other key 
aspects of the grievance facilitation process, both documents essentially leave 
these questions to be resolved another day. 
II. ANALYSIS 
In order to examine the efficacy of the governance regime established by 
the ICoC and the Charter, we need to analyze how well the regime seems to 
reflect and protect core public values. Such values include both the 
fundamental goals of public participation, transparency, and accountability 
embodied in global administrative law, as well as the substantive human- 
dignity values embodied in human rights and humanitarian law.101 Of course, 
any analysis is tentative at this point because the regime is not yet 
operational102 and, as discussed above, some important aspects of the 
grievance process in particular remain to be fleshed out.103 Nevertheless, some 
preliminary observations are possible. In this Part, I describe the core values I 
believe we should use as metrics for analysis and then measure the ICoC 
process and its substantive provisions against those metrics. I conclude that the 
early indicators are promising, albeit preliminary, whether measured with 
regard to the process for creating the ICoC regime or the substantive 
provisions of the Code itself. 
A. Core Public Values 
For the purpose of this analysis, I have chosen to focus on a few core public 
values, both procedural and substantive. First, we can analyze the ICoC with 
regard to the values of public participation, transparency, and accountability, 
the principal values of global administrative law. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico 
Krisch, and Richard Stewart have argued that increased global interdependence 
 
 100 See, e.g., Saleh, 580 F.3d at 5 (adopting broad theory of federal preemption of tort claims arising on a 
battlefield); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown, & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claim against a contractor on political question grounds). But see 
Brent Kendall, Contractor’s Torture Settlement a Milestone: Payment of $5.28 Million at Abu Ghraib in Iraq 
Underscores Legal Risk for Firms in War Zones, WALL STREET J., Jan. 10, 2013, at A7 (detailing a large 
settlement between private military contractors and detainees abused at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq). 
 101 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 15, 16 (2005). 
 102 See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
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has spawned a global administrative space.104 They suggest that an 
administrative law framework attuned to the global sphere might offer a means 
of analyzing forms of transnational public and private power, and they suggest 
that these three values lie at the core of this framework.105 Public participation, 
which has long been a central preoccupation of administrative law, is perhaps 
the most important value here. And significantly, the administrative law view 
of public participation is not simply concerned with making sure a voting 
polity ratifies all governmental decisions. Rather, it focuses on ensuring that 
there is some sort of dialogue, even if informal, between the government and 
the governed to act as a check on power and guard against the possibility of 
capture by interest groups. 
Public participation is particularly complex in the global, transnational 
space. Of course, fundamental democratic principles would seem to dictate that 
domestic publics should be permitted to participate in the decision-making of 
their own governments. However, this simple idea is hard enough to effectuate 
in the modern administrative state with regard to governmental actors.106 
Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself, through its notice-and-
comment process, was an overarching attempt to provide meaningful public 
involvement in a new era in which legislatures had delegated multiple 
activities to enormous administrative agencies.107 Yet critics have charged that 
the APA framework does not afford meaningful participation. Public choice 
scholars have long suggested that the framework allows agency capture by 
narrow interests.108 And empirical studies have demonstrated that entities with 
concentrated interests, such as certain sectors of industry, are more likely to 
spur agency officials to change their policies.109 Indeed, it could be argued that 
 
 104 Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 26. 
 105 See id. at 29 (“The focus of the field of global administrative law is not, therefore, the specific content 
of substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or possible principles, procedural rules, review 
mechanisms, and other mechanisms relating to transparency, participation, reasoned decisionmaking, and 
assurance of legality in global governance.”). 
 106 See DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 102–44; Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101, 117 (2011).  
 107 For a careful overview of the history leading to the enactment of the APA, see George B. Shepherd, 
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. L. REV. 
1557, 1561–80 (1996). 
 108 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice 
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513 (1988). 
 109 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 87–88 (2006) (finding that EPA 
respondents found it likely that the White House “sought changes” that both reflected agency capture by 
business interests and yet furthered the national interest). 
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little meaningful input takes place through the formal structure at all and that 
most of the relevant inputs occur before the formal notice-and-comment time 
frame.110 
But whatever the difficulties of administrative delegation to public 
agencies, they are compounded when governments delegate important 
functions to private contractors. This is, in a sense, a “double delegation” (from 
legislator to agency to contractor) that tends to further reduce the spaces for 
participation.111 And, when we are talking of governments (or contractors) 
acting abroad, we have the additional question of whether such actors are in 
any way obligated to provide foreign publics an opportunity to participate in 
decision-making that affects them.112 Indeed, there is a robust debate about the 
precise obligations of international institutions to offer opportunities for public 
participation in their processes (beyond simply the involvement of 
representatives from individual governments).113 
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that the government that is 
projecting its power overseas has some obligations to provide for participation 
of its own citizens in the decisions regarding the projection of that power. 
Perhaps more controversially, I also assume that some measure of public 
 
 110 See, e.g., Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking 
Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 358 (2009) (arguing that the effectiveness of notice-and-
comment procedures is in doubt because much of the meaningful work takes place before the procedures 
begin). 
 111 See Paul R. Verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–25, 31, 46 (2007); Peter Lindseth, Agents 
Without Principals? Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and Fragmented Governance, in REFRAMING SELF-
REGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 107, 108–09 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 291, 293 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
 112 See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 419 
(2006).  
 113 For example, Robert Dahl has suggested that public participation values are inevitably undermined by 
delegations to international organizations, and therefore such delegations are only justified if the need for 
interdependence and cooperation outweighs the loss of participation. Robert A. Dahl, Can International 
Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-
Cordón eds., 1999); see also Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, in 
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5, at 26, 32 (Mary Kaldor et al. eds., 2005). Others, such as Richard Falk and 
Andrew Strauss, refuse to accept this loss of public participation and argue for forms of global democracy. 
Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 191, 193, 195 (2000). Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane attempt to 
strike a middle ground, arguing that global democracy is unworkable but that international organizations are 
subject to democratic checks through limits on delegated authority. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, 
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 32–33 (2005). 
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participation by foreign publics in decisions by foreign governments or 
international organizations affecting their populations is at least beneficial, if 
not obligatory. The case for such participation is particularly strong in 
situations in which the foreign government or international government has 
jurisdiction and control over a local population—for example in a refugee 
camp or detention facility—or where the local government is ineffectual and 
the foreign government or international organization (whether acting through 
contractors or directly) assumes a quasi-governmental role.114 
Transparency is a second core value in the global administrative space. 
Indeed, transparency can be conceptualized both as an end in itself and as a 
central element of political participation and accountability because 
transparency helps to maintain a feedback loop between government actors and 
those affected by government policy, despite the fact that agency officials do 
not themselves stand for election. In the United States, the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA),115 other sunshine laws,116 and whistleblower 
protections117 help protect the value of transparency. In the foreign affairs 
arena, these statutory frameworks balance the need for information to enable 
informed public participation in decision-making with the countervailing need 
for secrecy to protect national security.118 Scholars have suggested that 
transparency protections in the transnational space are also critical to foster 
dialogue and reasoned decision-making.119 This is because some international 
organizations and less formal international associations are notoriously 
 
 114 See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 112, at 398–99 (detailing abuses by private military contractors and 
aid workers in the context of West African refugee camps).  
 115 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
 116 See, e.g., Georgia Open Meetings Law, GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1 (2013) (requiring state and local 
government bodies to conduct their meetings so that the public can review and monitor elected officials).  
 117 See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 
(codified as amended in chapter 23 of 5 U.S.C.) (enhancing existing protections for federal employees who 
disclose information related to agency misconduct).  
 118 For example, FOIA exempts matters that are “specifically authorized . . . by an Executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and are “properly classified” as such. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(1)(A). In addition, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and a few other agencies are allowed to 
exempt their working files from the search and review requirements of FOIA. Id. § 552(b)(1)–(7). Yet, despite 
these exceptions, the statute has paved the way for the release of numerous documents that have shed light on 
government security practices. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of 
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1055–56 (2008) (describing a variety of security-related 
revelations that have emerged through FOIA requests).  
 119 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 37–39. 
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opaque,120 and transparency is therefore an important metric for evaluating 
such entities.121 
The final administrative law value is accountability, and so we must ask 
whether, and to whom, agencies, institutions, or contractors are held 
accountable. As I have written elsewhere, however, accountability, though 
often invoked as a value, is rarely defined, particularly in the literature on 
privatization.122 I have therefore suggested that we should disaggregate two 
forms of accountability that are often muddled: accountability as redress and 
accountability as managerial oversight.123 
In the first form of accountability, an authoritative individual or entity 
imposes a penalty if a person or organization has failed to comply with a 
particular rule or standard.124 This form of accountability is essentially 
backward-looking, involves a specific sanction, and occurs at a relatively 
discrete moment in time (though it could have deterrent effects in the 
future).125 When people speak of accountability, they often mean it in this 
sense: the idea that there is somewhere to go after the fact to punish 
wrongdoers and “hold them accountable.”126 Political scientists127 and 
lawyers128 typically refer to accountability in this way. 
 
 120 For a discussion of the veiled practices of the Berne Union and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, see Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three 
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 202 n.318, 203 (2005). 
 121 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 37–39. 
 122 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 104.  
 123 Id. at 103–04. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 104. 
 126 Id. at 103–04 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 127 See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra note 113, at 29 (“Accountability, as we use the term, implies that 
some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities 
have not been met.”). The authors distinguish accountability from other forms of constraint, noting that 
accountability implies recognition of “the legitimacy of (1) the operative standards for accountability and (2) 
the authority of the parties to the relationship.” Id. Moreover, they emphasize that accountability mechanisms 
“always operate after the fact,” though even when they “operate ex post . . . [they] can exert effects ex ante.” 
Id. at 30. 
 128 Administrative law scholar Jerry Mashaw also defines accountability in terms of redress. According to 
Mashaw, accountability includes “six important things: who is liable or accountable to whom; what they are 
liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards 
the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding that those 
standards have been breached.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on 
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 118 
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). Mashaw’s definition gestures to a broad range of mechanisms and processes 
DICKINSON GALLEYSPROOFS 1/31/2014 10:46 AM 
436 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:417 
In the second form of accountability, an authoritative individual or entity 
evaluates the performance of a person or organization and encourages that 
person to observe a particular rule or standard. “This form of accountability is 
essentially forward-looking, does not involve a particular sanction or penalty, 
and is ongoing.”129 For example, when we commonly say that “elected 
officials should be ‘held accountable’ by the electorate they represent or that a 
supervisor holds her employees ‘accountable,’” we are invoking this second 
form of accountability.130 “Here, accountability is not so much dependent on 
courts, tribunals, and other grievance bodies meting out punishment after the 
fact to redress specific infractions. Instead, managerial accountability entails 
some form of ongoing scrutiny over those carrying out an activity to ensure 
that those actors fulfill the purposes as specified.”131 Scholars and practitioners 
from the fields of business, public management, or economics often refer to 
accountability in this way.132 
Both types of accountability are, I would suggest, critical in the global 
space, and can be distinguished from the particular forms or mechanisms of 
accountability that implement them.133 And both can be used as a measure of 
an organization or entity’s respect for public values. 
Turning from a focus on administrative law values, we must also analyze 
the extent to which the ICoC regime conforms to core values of human dignity 
embodied in international human rights and humanitarian law. Obviously, such 
values are potentially threatened by security contractors who may use force 
and may therefore injure or kill soldiers or civilians. For example, we need 
look no further than the high-profile shootings in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 
2007, in which armed security guards from the private security firm 
 
that various actors may use to implement accountability. But by focusing on judging behavior and an “effect” 
or consequence, Mashaw’s definition implies a discrete moment of adjudication and some type of sanction. 
 129 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 103.  
 130 Id. at 104.  
 131 Id. 
 132 For example, Mark Moore, a professor of public management, focuses on what he terms “public 
accountability,” which he defines as “a form of accountability that allows a collective to define its purposes 
and then to develop the technical means for determining the degree to which those purposes have been 
achieved.” Mark Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212, 1225 (2003). In Moore’s concept, the “public” nature of the accountability is the fact that the 
collective has defined the purposes. Id. Determining whether a particular entity has performed those services is 
essentially a question of monitoring and oversight. Id. 
 133 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 103 (“Such mechanisms may include, for example, litigation (criminal 
or civil), contractual arrangements, political accountability—including the related issues of transparency and 
participation—and institutional accountability based on the administrative and organizational structure and 
culture of the relevant institutional actor.”). 
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Blackwater, under contract with the U.S. State Department, fired into a crowd, 
killing civilians.134 In addition, some firms may have engaged in practices that 
amount to human trafficking or forced labor.135 Meanwhile, security company 
employees themselves may also potentially be placed at risk in danger 
zones.136 And discrimination, harassment, or mere negligence on the part of 
company supervisors could infringe on employees’ human dignity as well.137 
Because these risks could arise either during armed conflict—in which case 
international humanitarian law would apply—or in peacetime—when 
international human rights law would govern138—it is necessary to focus on the 
values embodied in both bodies of law. 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law protect 
human dignity in multiple ways. For example, both bodies of law prohibit 
certain acts, such as torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.139 
Both bodies of law also limit killing or injuring others, though the standard 
varies depending on the context. International human rights law prohibits such 
acts except in the case of self-defense or as punishment for a crime after a fair 
trial with all the incidents of due process.140 In contrast, during an armed 
conflict international humanitarian law allows parties to intentionally kill or 
injure combatants141 but prohibits intentional killing of civilians as well as 
inflicting disproportionate harm to civilians while targeting combatants.142 
 
 134 James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2007, at A1; David Johnston & John M. Broder, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1. 
 135 For an account of such practices committed by a broad array of military contractors (not merely 
security firms), see Sarah Stillman, The Invisible Army, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2011, at 56.  
 136 Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1. 
 137 See Stillman, supra note 135, at 57.  
 138 Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities, 36 GEO. J. 
INT’L. L. 669, 674 (2005). 
 139 International human rights law prohibits torture most notably in the Torture Convention. Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The primary prohibition on torture during armed conflict 
is contained within what is referred to as “common article three,” the shared article of all four Geneva 
Conventions, which in turn articulate the primary framework for regulating warfare and limiting harm to 
civilians during all forms of armed conflict. For one example of common article three, see Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956). 
 140 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (setting forth the right to life). 
 141 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 
433–39 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the Geneva Conventions and other international laws on the use of force). 
 142 Id. 
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Again, while the standards vary, both bodies of law also limit the act of 
detention. 
International human rights law goes much further and provides for 
additional protections. These protections include, for example, bans on various 
forms of discrimination,143 as well as human trafficking,144 and forced labor.145 
At the same time, human rights law also guards human dignity by articulating 
numerous procedural due process rights in judicial proceedings.146 
Finally, I should note that, when I invoke these core public values of 
human dignity, participation, transparency, and accountability as benchmarks 
to evaluate the proposed ICoC and its proposed oversight mechanism, I 
recognize that some might object to labeling these values “public.” This is 
because, over the past fifty years, many values and rights that were once 
deemed public have been reframed or extended so that they apply well beyond 
the traditionally public sphere. Thus, for example, drawing on legal realism, 
many scholars and lawmakers in the civil rights era reconceived certain 
antidiscrimination rights as belonging to individuals regardless of whether the 
infringer was a policeman or a restauranteur.147 Accordingly, it might seem 
anachronistic to try to privilege certain rights or values as quintessentially 
public. 
By using the term “public values,” however, I do not intend to reinscribe a 
sharp or essential division between public and private spheres or to argue that 
the values shift from sphere to sphere. On the contrary, the whole point of 
regimes like the ICoC is to extend these public values so that they will apply to 
private contractors acting at the behest of governments. Thus, it is my position 
that the values remain core public values and that those values can and should 
be applied, regardless of whether the actor in question is public or private. 
 
 143 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 26 (recognizing that all persons deserve equal protection before 
the law).  
 144 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.  
 145 See ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 8.3 (“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labor.”); see also Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 
U.N.T.S. 291 (“[T]his Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labour . . . .”). 
 146 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 140, arts. 9, 14 (preserving due process rights for all persons subject to 
the Convention). 
 147 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal 
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 86–91 (1967). 
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B. The ICoC and Public Values 
If we now turn to examine the ICoC and the governance mechanism in 
light of these core public values, we can see that, at least at this preliminary 
stage, they hold up quite well and show tremendous promise as a model of 
public/private governance. Here, it is important to look both at the process by 
which the regime was created and the substantive terms and structures of the 
regime itself. 
1. The Process of Creating the ICoC 
One of the distinctive features of the ICoC and its accompanying 
governance mechanism is how transparent and participatory the process of 
their creation has been. Initiated during a series of workshops and conferences 
in the spring of 2009, multiple stakeholders were present from the start.148 
Representing governments, the Swiss, as discussed earlier, convened the 
initiative,149 but representatives from the U.S. and British governments (two of 
the largest employers of security contractors) were also involved up front.150 
Representing civil society, Human Rights First and the Center for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) co-hosted a briefing in New 
York in October 2009151 focused on identifying gaps in international law with 
regard to security contractors and suggesting an important role for the Code.152 
Meanwhile, a broad array of industry associations issued a declaration in 
support of a code in June 2009, following a multi-stakeholder conference in 
Nyon, Switzerland.153 Signed by Chris Grayling, of the Pan-African Security 
Association; Doug Brooks, of the International Peace Operations Association 
(now the International Stability Operations Association); and Andrew 
Bearpark, of the British Association of Private Security Companies,154 the 
Nyon Declaration asserts industry consensus on the need for a code of conduct: 
 
 148 See FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that the ICoC process involved private security 
companies, industry associations, governmental representatives, and various humanitarian and 
nongovernmental organizations). 
 149 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Industry Statement from the Int’l Peace Operations Ass’n, British Ass’n of Private Sec. Cos., and Pan 
African Sec. Ass’n (June 6, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.06_-__Nyon_Declaration.pdf. 
DICKINSON GALLEYSPROOFS 1/31/2014 10:46 AM 
440 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:417 
[T]he industry representatives now present at the conference consider 
it time to pursue and develop an international code of conduct for the 
companies themselves in all situations. 
Following a collective process involving pertinent stakeholders, 
we have achieved a broad consensus that an international code of 
conduct must be compliant with Human Rights and IHL. Further, 
there is a clear necessity for effective oversight, accountability and 
operational standards in such a code. 
. . . . 
We see this process as an opportunity to enhance our ability to 
address broader stakeholder concerns and to serve all our clients, 
government and otherwise, in a transparent, professional and ethical 
manner.155 
When it came to developing the specific provisions of the code of conduct, 
again a broad array of groups participated. The first version of the Code, 
released in January 2010, was initially drafted by the Swiss government along 
with its partners, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights (ADH) and DCAF.156 However, this draft was the product of a 
“series of workshops and consultations with industry associations, 
corporations, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, 
other stakeholders and relevant experts.”157 Multiple stakeholders were given 
the opportunity to comment on, and give input on, the draft.158 For example, 
the U.S. Institute of Peace hosted a meeting in February 2010 for the purpose 
of enabling civil society and humanitarian relief organizations to provide 
comments.159 And, in an April 2010 meeting “to provide an update to 
participants on the Draft Code,” participants included representatives from 
governments and international organizations, practitioners with a security 
background, nongovernmental clients of private security firms, civil society 
groups (both those that employ security firms and those that seek a watchdog 
role), and academics.160 
The Code-writing process involved many drafts, with multiple 
opportunities for diverse stakeholders to comment. For example, in the 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.  
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
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summer of 2010, the initial draft, which had been circulated widely and 
discussed at multiple conferences and events, received thirty-seven written 
comments spanning nearly two hundred pages.161 The second draft went 
through a similarly rigorous process of evaluation and discussion in a series of 
conferences and workshops.162 Some of these gatherings focused on specific 
constituencies, such as a September 2010 meeting that “invited representatives 
of the industry and governments, with the objective to explain the importance 
of the Code to industry and allow them [to participate in] the drafting.”163 The 
process culminated in a conference in Geneva in November 2010, at which the 
final draft was adopted.164 Fifty-eight security companies signed the Code 
immediately,165 and as of September 2013, there are 708 signatories,166 a truly 
impressive degree of industry buy-in and participation. 
The drafting process for the governance and oversight mechanism involved 
a similarly broad array of stakeholders from government, industry, and civil 
society.167 A steering committee, selected after the November 2010 conference 
by each stakeholder group, supervised the project.168 Committee members 
included representatives from industry, civil society, and government: from 
industry, Mark DeWitt (Triple Canopy), Andrew Nicholson (Drum Cussac), 
Brent Wegner (GardaWorld), and Sylvia White (Aegis); from civil society, 
Chris Albin-Lackey (Human Rights Watch), Nils Melzer (Geneva Center for 
Security Policy), Meg Roggensack (Human Rights First), and James Cockayne 
(independent); from government, Josh Dorosin (U.S. Department of State), 
David Dutton (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), and Paul 
McGrade (U.K. Foreign Commonwealth Office).169 The steering committee 
issued a work plan and time line, and then formed three working groups to 
focus on the specific issues of (1) assessment, reporting, and internal and 
 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies, INT’L 
CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_ 
Companies_-_September_2013_-_Composite_List-1.pdf [hereinafter ICoC Signatory Companies]. 
 167 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.  
 168 Id. 
 169 ICoC Temporary Steering Committee (TSC), INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Steering_Committee.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Steering 
Committee]. 
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external oversight; (2) resolution of third party grievances; and (3) governance 
mechanism structures and funding.170 
The Steering Committee met regularly over the next two years, and, as in 
the case of the Code itself, held multiple events allowing stakeholders to give 
feedback.171 In addition, each working group consulted with experts and 
provided the public with an opportunity to comment on the draft.172 Moreover, 
significant changes were made, based on these comments.173 Final agreement 
was reached on February 22, 2013, regarding the Charter for the oversight 
mechanism.174 The next step is to establish this mechanism, which was 
formally launched in Geneva in September of 2013,175 and to begin hiring 
staff. 
Despite this extensive, broad-based input, participation could perhaps have 
been even wider. For example, the governments represented on the steering 
committee for the oversight mechanism consisted entirely of Western, 
developed countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia).176 
Many leading host countries, such as Iraq, were notably absent, as were 
countries from the developing world more generally. Industry representation 
on the steering committee likewise consisted of companies headquartered in 
the developed world.177 Although many large conferences and smaller 
meetings were held, all were in Western, developed countries (Switzerland, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom).178 A meeting in Africa, the Middle 
East, Asia, or South America would likely have added a different mix of voices 
 
 170 Temp. Steering Comm. for the Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Sec. Serv. Providers, Work Plan, 
INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS (May 11, 2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ 
ICOCWorkPlan-final_11_May_2011.pdf [hereinafter Work Plan]. 
 171 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14. 
 172 FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2–4.  
 173 See Comments on the Draft Charter, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Comments_Draft_Charter_ICoC.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 174 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers—Consensus on Oversight 
Mechanism, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/ 
media/single.html?id=47889. 
 175 About the ICoC Association, supra note 17. 
 176 See ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.  
 177 Triple Canopy has its headquarters in the United States, Locations, TRIPLE CANOPY, http://www. 
triplecanopy.com/company/locations/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2013), the headquarters of Aegis and Drum Cussac 
are located in the United Kingdom, Contact, AEGIS, http://www.aegisworld.com/contact (last visited Dec. 13, 
2013); Global Presence, DRUM CUSSAC, http://www.drum-cussac.com/globalpresence.aspx (last visited Dec. 
13, 2013), and Garda Global is headquartered in Canada, Locations, GW, http://www.garda-world.com/ 
locations (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 178 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.  
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and perspectives. In addition, private clients of security firms—often large, 
multinational corporations such as those in the extractive industries—were 
mostly absent from the process. Although at least one meeting apparently 
included such corporations,179 the primary conceptualization and drafting of 
the Code and oversight mechanism were undertaken by others, despite the fact 
that these corporations will likely be major employers of private contractors 
subject to the Code, and they could also ultimately help fund the oversight 
regime. Accordingly, greater involvement from this group would likely have 
been beneficial. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that participation overall in the 
development of the Code and oversight mechanism was extraordinarily broad. 
Multiple stakeholder groups jointly led the initiative at every turn.180 And 
while only Western, developed countries served on the steering committee, 
these countries are, in practice, the leading governmental clients for security 
firms. Although industry representation on the steering committee was 
similarly skewed, the companies that have now signed the Code are much 
more diverse, with headquarters on five continents.181 Moreover, there were at 
least two meetings designed to reach out to an even broader array of firms,182 
and the adoption of the Code was delayed for several months in part to enable 
African firms to evaluate the Code at the annual conference of African security 
firms.183 By holding numerous conferences, workshops, and informal 
discussions with a wide range of groups and individuals, the convenors 
ensured broad input. 
The process was also strikingly transparent. The convenors established a 
public website with news of meetings and workshops.184 On the website, they 
provided the agendas for many of these events,185 as well as relevant 
 
 179 Id. 
 180 See FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2 (noting the various categories of actors involved in the process). 
 181 See INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/Home_Page. 
html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter ICoC Homepage] (providing a map of contractor headquarters by 
country). 
 182 See ICoC Timeline, supra note 14 (meetings in September 2010 in London and Washington, D.C.).  
 183 See, e.g., Discussion Document, Meeting for Finalizing Code of Conduct (Sept. 29–30, 2010), 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2010.09.29_-_Geneva.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 184 See ICoC Homepage, supra note 181.  
 185 See, e.g., Workshop Agenda, Ctr. for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Towards an 
International PMSC Code of Conduct (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.04.19_-
_Agenda_CoC_Workshop_II_Geneva.pdf. 
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documents such as concept papers.186 For steering committee meetings, they 
provided the time line for,187 and agendas and minutes from, each meeting.188 
In addition, they developed and published the steering committee’s internal 
rules and procedures,189 as well as guidelines for the working groups.190 And 
the steering committee published a detailed plan of work and time frame for 
that plan.191 
Particularly noteworthy is what amounted to a public notice-and-comment 
process for both the Code and the Charter regarding the oversight mechanism. 
In both cases, the convenors circulated multiple drafts via e-mail to 
stakeholders and, in addition, posted the drafts on the website.192 In addition, 
the convenors gave the public the opportunity to provide written comments, as 
well as more informal input at various meetings, workshops, and 
conferences.193 These comments—including comments from thirty-seven 
entities responding to the draft Code,194 and from forty entities responding to 
the draft Charter195—are publicly available on the website. In the case of the 
Charter, the Temporary Steering Committee provided not only the comments 
but an account of the Committee’s response to each comment as reflected in 
the second draft of the Charter.196 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine a substantially more transparent process for 
developing the Code and Charter. Perhaps the convenors could have provided 
information identifying the individuals and entities in attendance at the various 
meetings. In some cases, as for the temporary steering committee meetings, the 
 
 186 See, e.g., Concept Paper: Areas Requiring Further Consideration for the ICoC, INT’L CODE CONDUCT 
FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/TSC_Concept_Paper-final_2011May.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013).  
 187 Steering Committee, supra note 169.  
 188 See, e.g., Minutes, Temporary Steering Committee Meeting (Jan. 16–18, 2013), http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/2013.01.16_-_Minutes_TSC.pdf. 
 189 THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (ICOC) 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STEERING COMMITTEE (2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Steering_ 
Committee_Rules_-_Final.pdf. 
 190 Guidance on Working Groups, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_TSC_Working_Group_Guidelines_05-04-2011_-__Final.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 191 Work Plan, supra note 170.  
 192 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Comments on the Draft Charter, supra note 173.  
 196 Id. 
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minutes do identify the participants.197 In other cases, the website might 
provide the agenda for, and speakers at, a meeting without identifying the 
stakeholder participants.198 But these are minor criticisms. Overall, the process 
has been a model of transparency and inclusion. 
Indeed, with respect to both transparency and participation, the process for 
drafting the Code and Charter fares as well as, if not better than, domestic 
rulemaking. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-
comment requirements mandate that agencies provide notice of proposed 
rulemaking and give the interested public time to comment.199 As we have 
seen, during the process to draft the Code and Charter, the convenors likewise 
provided both adequate notice and ample opportunity to comment.200 Indeed, 
the convenors went further than domestic rulemaking, which does not in all 
cases require that public meetings be held.201 And the process far exceeded 
what foreign policy agencies such as the Department of Defense and State 
Department typically provide.202 Though little discussed, these agencies do 
engage in some rulemaking that falls within at least broad contours of the 
APA.203 But in many cases these agencies do not follow the procedures 
scrupulously,204 and it is unclear how many rules the agencies decline to 
 
 197 See, e.g., Minutes, Temporary Steering Committee Meeting (Nov. 28–30, 2012), http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/2012.11.28-_Activities_TSC_November.pdf (identifying participants at the meeting). 
 198 See, e.g., Workshop Agenda, Ctr. for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Towards an 
International PMSC Code of Conduct (May 8, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.05.08_-
_Agenda_CoC_Workshop_III_Geneva.pdf. 
 199 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Thus, under the primary default procedures contained in § 553(b)(3) of the 
APA, an agency must first provide public notice of any contemplated rulemaking activity by publishing, in the 
Federal Register, “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.” Next, under § 553(c), the agency must offer interested persons an opportunity to participate through 
the submission of written comments. Unlike some of the legislative proposals that Congress rejected, the APA 
does not require the agency to hold a public hearing. Then, upon issuing a final rule, the agency must include a 
“concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.” Id. Because courts have relied on legislative 
history that suggests Congress wanted this statement to explain the final regulations, preambles to final rules 
“tend to be more comprehensive than concise, including detailed discussions of the regulations’ goals and 
methods, negative comments received, and the agency’s responses thereto.” Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring 
Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act 
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1733 (2007). 
 200 See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 201 See discussion supra note 199. 
 202 Laura A. Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Foreign Policy Agencies (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); see also David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187 
(2010). 
 203 See Dickinson, supra note 202. 
 204 Id. Indeed, even other agencies such as the Treasury Department fail to follow the notice-and-comment 
procedures scrupulously. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 199, at 1730. 
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submit to the process altogether, as there are broad exemptions for military and 
foreign policy functions.205 Moreover, according to empirical studies, even 
when agencies follow the procedural requirements of the APA to the letter, 
public participation in rulemaking through the notice-and-comment process 
often has minimal impact on substantive rules.206 In contrast, as discussed 
above, the comments on the Code and Charter resulted in significant changes 
to the regime.207 
The opportunity for the public to participate and the transparency of the 
process were also arguably greater than in many treaty-drafting initiatives. 
Because treaties are agreements between and among states, civil society 
organizations and industry groups often do not have a seat at the negotiating 
table, even though they may be allowed to sit in and comment on some aspects 
of the proceedings.208 Moreover, what goes on inside the negotiating room is 
often secret. Here, not only did civil society organizations and industry groups 
participate in public conferences to discuss drafts, they actually helped direct 
the process. 
2. The ICoC’s Substantive Provisions 
The regime also fares well if measured for its normative commitment to 
human dignity, public participation, transparency, and accountability. 
a. Human Dignity 
As described above, the Code provides a robust set of protections regarding 
human dignity.209 It offers clear, specific, and detailed articulations of multiple 
critical norms.210 And it explicitly applies international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law to contractors,211 even though contractors often 
 
 205 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).  
 206 See Hickman, supra note 199; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-
Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58 (2013). Public participation through the notice-and-
comment process is more likely to have an impact if those advocating for a particular change to a rule have a 
concentrated interest. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 109, at 51. 
 207 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
 208 To be sure, some scholars have critiqued such broad-based participation as antidemocratic. The 
argument is that only official governmental representatives, selected or appointed through official democratic 
processes, can legitimately speak for a polity. To allow other groups a seat at the table could undermine the 
democratic framework. 
 209 See supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text. 
 210 See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 30. 
 211 See id. ¶ 3. 
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occupy a gray area in the international instruments themselves.212 Furthermore, 
in contested areas such as defining torture, the Code takes an aggressive 
approach.213 If the oversight and enforcement mechanisms end up having teeth, 
then there is little doubt that the Code would be a huge step forward in 
extending core norms of human dignity to the entire security contractor 
industry. 
b. Public Participation 
The regime also provides significant opportunities for participation from 
multiple stakeholders. First, the Board itself is composed of members from 
each stakeholder group (civil society, industry, and government).214 Each 
group is equally represented and has the responsibility of electing its particular 
Board members.215 Moreover, the voting structure ensures that no voting block 
formed by two stakeholder groups can push through policy over the objection 
of the third.216 This is because decisions are made by a majority vote of at least 
eight Board members, but in addition at least two Board members from each 
stakeholder group must support the decision.217 While this provision could lead 
to a stalemate, it ensures that the development of the Code and its oversight 
mechanism continues to have support from government, industry, and human 
rights NGOs. 
In addition, beyond the Board, there are opportunities for broad 
participation. At regular meetings, the regime offers members from each 
stakeholder group the chance to consult with one another, the Board, and the 
Secretariat.218 To date, industry representation is extraordinarily extensive, 
including 708 companies from 79 countries and territories on 5 continents.219 It 
still remains to be seen how many governments will be involved in the regime, 
and how broad civil society representation will be. But unlike the process for 
drafting the Code and the Charter, where non-Western countries and NGOs 
were not particularly involved,220 the regime in operation contemplates no 
 
 212 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 213 See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶¶ 35–37. 
 214 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 3.1. 
 215 Id. art. 7.2. 
 216 Id. art. 7.6. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. art. 6.2. 
 219 ICoC Signatory Companies, supra note 166. 
 220 See supra 171–79 and accompanying text.  
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limits regarding the participation of such governments and civil society 
groups.221 
As noted above, one key stakeholder group that does not yet have a clear 
seat at the table in the regime is the group of corporations, such as those in the 
extraction industries, that regularly employ private security contractors. These 
corporations do not have a role in the regime comparable to the three primary 
stakeholder groups.222 Nevertheless, the Charter does provide that the Board 
may adopt rules to grant “observer status” to other stakeholder groups, and 
specifically mentions “non-state clients,” as one such group.223 Thus, such 
entities can at least have a role in the process, albeit a less central one. In any 
event, the broad participation agreement contemplated by the ICoC is a model 
of multi-stakeholder deliberation and involvement. 
c. Transparency 
The regime is also extraordinarily transparent, particularly when compared 
to the opaque quality of many multilateral transnational agreements. This 
transparency has two components: first, the ICoC imposes significant 
transparency requirements on its members;224 and, second, the Association’s 
own processes are designed to remain reasonably transparent.225 
To become members of the Association administering the ICoC, 
governments and international organizations must agree to comply with the 
Montreux process, which requires them to “commit to provide information 
related to their implementation of the Montreux Document and the Code, 
including the development of their domestic regulatory framework for PSC 
activities.”226 Thus, such governments will need to publicly disclose their 
progress (or lack thereof) in developing domestic regulatory structures for the 
security contractor industry. 
For their part, civil society groups wishing to participate will need to 
demonstrate that they have a strong record of promoting international human 
 
 221 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 3.1. 
 222 See id. (establishing three stakeholder pillars, none of which are dedicated to such corporations). 
 223 Id. art. 3.4. 
 224 See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 53 (requiring signatory companies to maintain records for seven years and 
mandating access to such records unless impermissible by law). 
 225 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, arts. 9.3, 10.1 (designating the Secretariat as 
being responsible for maintaining all records and establishing an advisory forum open to all participants 
regardless of membership status). 
 226 Id. art. 3.3.2. 
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rights or humanitarian law and that they operate independent from both 
government and industry.227 This provision helps ensure that the civil society 
groups involved are true watchdogs and not mere fronts for government or 
industry masquerading as NGOs. Such independent monitoring aids 
transparency because these groups, if they are truly independent, are far more 
reliable whistleblowers should the ICoC or its oversight mechanism begin to 
devolve into something ineffective. 
Finally, the contractor firms, to be certified under the ICoC, must issue a 
“written, public declaration of their intent to adhere to the Code,”228 as well as 
provide evidence to the Board that supports the declaration.229 As part of their 
compliance, these firms must publish grievance procedures on their 
websites,230 and “undertake to be transparent regarding their progress towards 
implementing the Code’s principles.”231 Most importantly, as noted above, 
certified firms are subject to robust reporting requirements concerning use-of-
force incidents,232 internal oversight procedures,233 and mechanisms for 
addressing grievances.234 These reports can form the basis for a far more 
transparent system for addressing potential problems related to private security 
contractors than has been the norm so far. 
As to the Association’s own processes, the ICoC requires the group to 
develop procedures for certification,235 performance assessment,236 and 
facilitation of grievances.237 It is anticipated that these procedures will be 
public, providing transparent criteria for performance assessment.238 In 
addition, after undertaking a performance assessment of a particular company, 
“the Board may issue a public statement on the status or outcome of the 
Association’s review of a Member company.”239 And, with regard to grievance 
procedures, the Board is expected to publish public “guidance to Members on 
 
 227 Id. art. 3.3.3. 
 228 Id. art. 11.2.3. 
 229 Id. art. 11.2.1–.2.  
 230 ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 67(b).  
 231 Id. ¶ 8. 
 232 See id. ¶ 37. 
 233 See id. ¶ 6(d) (requiring members to establish and maintain an internal governance framework).  
 234 See id. ¶ 66. 
 235 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 11.1. 
 236 See id. art. 12. 
 237 See id. art. 13. 
 238 Id. art. 12.2.2. 
 239 Id. art. 12.2.9.  
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best practice and compliance”240 with requirements involving their obligation 
to establish fair and accessible internal grievance procedures,241 publish them 
on a website,242 investigate claims promptly,243 keep records,244 cooperate with 
parallel investigations,245 take disciplinary action,246 and provide whistleblower 
protections.247 
Finally, “[t]he Association will report publicly, no less than annually, on its 
activities” pertaining to reporting, monitoring, and performance assessment.248 
Moreover, as an independent legal entity with legal capacity governed by 
Swiss law,249 the Association may have additional transparency requirements 
as provided by Swiss law. The Swiss government will also publicly list all 
signatory companies.250 This combination of provisions ensures a striking 
degree of transparency, both with regard to the crucial activities of the private 
security firms and the governance process itself. 
d. Accountability 
As discussed previously, accountability encompasses both managerial 
accountability, which involves creating institutional and organizational 
structures that embed accountability in a forward-looking manner, and 
accountability as redress, which looks to after-the-fact punishment 
mechanisms.251 Here, I discuss the ways that the ICoC and Charter feature both 
forms of accountability. 
i. Managerial Accountability 
The certification requirements impose some forms of managerial 
accountability. Participating firms must certify that they meet the Code 
obligations, which require the company to have internal managerial controls to 
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ensure compliance.252 Signatory companies commit “to take steps to establish 
and maintain an effective internal governance framework in order to deter, 
monitor, report, and effectively address adverse impacts on human rights.”253 
In addition, companies agree “to establish and/or demonstrate internal 
processes to meet the requirements of the Code’s principles and the standards 
derived from the Code.”254 
Meanwhile, the Association and Board agree to “[e]stablish external 
independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight, which will 
include Certification . . . , Auditing[,] and Monitoring of [the companies’] 
work in the field.”255 Significantly, such ongoing auditing and performance 
assessment will be conducted by outside entities,256 which is likely to affect 
significantly the internal governance and accountability mechanisms of the 
firms. Indeed, auditing is defined as 
a process through which independent auditors, accredited by the 
governance and oversight mechanism, conduct on-site audits, 
including in the field, on a periodic basis, gathering data to be 
reported to the governance and oversight mechanism which will in 
turn verify whether a Company is meeting requirements and if not, 
what remediation may be required.257 
Finally, the Charter also requires ongoing monitoring and performance 
assessment by the Board and Association itself. Thus, companies need to 
provide regular written self-assessments to the Board and Association,258 and 
“[t]he Association shall be responsible for exercising oversight of Member 
companies’ performance under the Code, including through external 
monitoring, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the 
code.”259 Moreover, if the Association is concerned about a firm’s compliance, 
field missions may be authorized,260 and the Secretariat shall review 
information obtained and engage in dialogue with the firm regarding possible 
reforms.261 The Board can also intervene and conduct reviews of firms, either 
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on the recommendation of the Executive Director or on its own initiative.262 
The Board can also request corrective action and can ultimately suspend a firm 
or terminate its membership,263 which may make it more difficult for the firm 
to obtain future contracts. 
ii. Accountability as Redress 
As described previously, the Code creates a series of procedures by which 
use of force and other questionable incidents are reported, investigated, and 
adjudicated.264 First, signatory companies are required to report all incidents 
involving the use of a weapon.265 This report is submitted to the client and 
competent authorities, though as of yet it is unclear whether the Association or 
Board will also receive a copy.266 In addition, companies must establish an 
internal grievance process that is fair, accessible, and offers effective 
remedies.267 They must publish details of their procedures, investigate 
allegations promptly, keep records of the investigations, cooperate with official 
investigations, take appropriate disciplinary action, and provide whistleblower 
protections.268 This is a far more robust set of accountability mechanisms than 
exists currently with regard to private security contractors. 
The Association itself is also empowered to take steps to “support Member 
companies” in their obligations under the Code to resolve grievances through 
their internal mechanisms.269 Thus, the Secretariat can receive claims from 
company personnel and third parties.270 The Secretariat can then communicate 
with claimants regarding available grievance procedures.271 If a claimant 
alleges that a company’s procedure is not fair, not accessible, or does not offer 
an effective remedy, the Secretariat can review that allegation.272 After such a 
review, the Secretariat enters a dialogue with the company, and if the 
grievance process is deemed inadequate, the Secretariat can recommend 
corrective action and/or suggest referral to another “fair and accessible 
 
 262 Id. art. 12.2.6. 
 263 Id. art. 13.2.7. 
 264 See supra Part I.B.  
 265 ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 63. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. ¶ 67(a). 
 268 Id. ¶ 67. 
 269 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 13.1. 
 270 Id. art. 13.2.1. 
 271 Id. art. 13.2.2. 
 272 Id. art. 13.2.3. 
DICKINSON GALLEYSPROOFS 1/31/2014 10:46 AM 
2013] REGULATING THE PRIVATIZED SECURITY INDUSTRY 453 
grievance procedure that may offer an effective remedy.”273 For its part, the 
Board may request referral, which could “include cooperation with the 
Association’s good offices, the provision of a neutral and confidential 
mediation process, or other arrangements that may assist the Member company 
to offer an effective remedy.”274 And of course, as previously mentioned, if a 
company does not cooperate sufficiently, the Board can impose sanctions or 
suspend the company’s certification.275 
Thus, the regime, while not itself subjecting noncompliant contractors to 
formal civil or criminal sanctions, has far more robust compliance and 
accountability mechanisms than many other voluntary industry-driven codes of 
conduct. Significantly, much of the monitoring is from independent outside 
entities, and the ultimate sanction of banishment from the regime may render 
firms ineligible to receive lucrative contracts, particularly if governments agree 
only to hire certified security contractors. 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, the governance and oversight mechanism for the ICoC, while 
formally launched in September 2013, is not yet fully operational. Much will 
ultimately depend on how the various compliance and grievance procedures 
are implemented and enforced. It is certainly possible that the opportunity will 
be lost, and the Code provisions will become mere paper aspirations. Further 
review will obviously be necessary. 
However, many of the components are in place for a relatively robust 
public/private oversight regime. Most importantly, the ICoC is a true 
public/private partnership; it is not just industry self-regulation. Both the 
process for drafting the Code and Charter and the ongoing Board structure 
ensure that governments and human rights NGOs remain at the table, which 
will presumably help ensure the Code is implemented with the serious 
compliance energy originally envisioned. 
Thus, in a world fraught with violence and the possibility for abuse, where 
oversight has been virtually nonexistent, we now see emerging a true effort to 
demand accountability. Developed in a comparatively quick, transparent, and 
participatory process, a mechanism is emerging that has the chance to provide 
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real oversight and encourage institutional reform of an industry that has been 
difficult to tame through the classic means of international and domestic law. 
This in itself is an important advance, and it also suggests a roadmap for other 
public/private governance and oversight partnerships that might be considered 
in the future. 
 
